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Abstract
Recent approaches to human concept learning have successfully combined the power of
symbolic, infinitely productive, rule systems and statistical learning. The aim of most
of these studies is to reveal the underlying language structuring these representations
and providing a general substrate for thought. Here, we ask about the plasticity of
symbolic descriptive languages. We perform two concept learning experiments, that
consistently demonstrate that humans can change very rapidly the repertoire of symbols
they use to identify concepts, by compiling expressions which are frequently used into
new symbols of the language. The pattern of concept learning times is accurately
described by a Bayesian agent that rationally updates the probability of compiling a
new expression according to how useful it has been to compress concepts so far. By
portraying the Language of Thought as a flexible system of rules, we also highlight the
intrinsic difficulties to pin it down empirically.
Keywords: Language of Thought, Concept Learning, Probabilistic Inference
1. Introduction
How can children acquire a vast universe of concepts with seemingly very little
exposure? One possible solution to this conundurm, known as the Plato Problem [1, 2],
builds on the human capacity to describe concepts –and more generally of all elements
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of thought– through the use of a symbolic and combinatorial mental language [3],
referred as language of thought (LoT) [4].
Combinatorial languages can describe a vast set of concepts from a small set of
primitives. This can be understood in a relatively simple example in the domain
of shapes. A combinatorial and symbolic language similar to Logo [5] can combine
operations such as “move”, “pen up”, “pen down” or “rotate” to generate an infinite
set of expressions (or programs) which, when evaluated, can convey all sort of shapes.
A language describing concepts (like shapes) also provides a natural notion of their
complexity. A concept is simple, relative to that language, when it can be described
by a short program. On the contrary, it is complex when all its descriptions require a
long sequence of instructions.
For example, in the case of the Logo language, a square, can simply be instructed
as a loop of four displacements followed by rotations of 90 degrees. In this language,
the icon of a face will be implemented by a significant lengthier program and hence
will be more complex. However, this concept would be simpler when described in a
language in which the icon of a face (or the symbols for nose, mouth, etc.) are available
as primitives in the language.
Based on Occam’s razor criterion, and more formally on the notions of Kolmogorov
complexity [6], a working hypothesis for most studies of LoTs is that the subjective
complexity of a concept for human learners is linked to the length of the minimal
program that describes it [7], i.e. its minimum description length, or MDL [8]. In the
domain of Boolean concepts, a wide range of logical varieties of concepts was studied
in [9], revealing a surprisingly simple ‘law’ (although see [10]): the subjective difficulty
of a Boolean concept is directly proportional to the length of the shortest compatible
program in the language of propositional logic (i.e. Boolean variables combined with
the operators and, or and not).
The correlation between the subjective difficulty of concepts and their MDL has
been used as a general vehicle to study LoT in various domains [11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. Although often implicit, the general strategy is to 1) assume a
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language; 2) find the shortest compatible program for some concepts in that language;
3) compare the length of these programs with the subjective difficulty of the concepts;
and finally 4) repeat this process for various languages within a universe of possible
candidates and choose the one that gives the best match. As mentioned before, the
length of the program depends on the primitives of the language in which this program
is written, so different languages make different predictions.
A natural question is whether the primitives of a LoT are universal –both across
different individuals and also throughout development– or if instead the semantic reper-
toire of a language is dynamic and shaped by experience. This posits an important
challenge when trying to pin down a LoT in a certain domain: if the LoT is shaped
by experience, then it should vary according to the sequence of concepts to which each
participant was exposed to.
In this work, we show that the subjective difficulty of sequential Boolean concepts
is inconsistent with a universal, static LoT. We examine the hypothesis that humans
have the ability to recombine propositions of a LoT, becoming a new primitive of
the language. In other words, that learning leads to a process of compiling routines
into functions within the LoT. In the example of the Logo language one can imagine
that if productions which draw squares are very frequent, it would be efficient to
devote a new symbol to this production. The new symbol ‘square’ is a hierarchical
‘second order’ construction of the ‘first order’ primitives of the language. It has a
cost (of increasing the lexicon of the language) but in the new language, drawing a
square can be instantiated with a very short program (namely, ‘square’) and hence
uses less memory. This does not entail an advantage for a universal Turing Machine,
but for human computation, which is bounded by severe memory limitations, compiling
symbols may be a fundamental process of learning.
This idea –which in pure theoretical terms lies at the essence of Solomonoff induc-
tion [22]–, has been exploited in most traditional cognitive architectures [23, 24, 25, 26],
where useful programs are stored in memory as modules for later use. It was also
present in the first conceptions of a LoT [4], where it is stated that even if a low-level,
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internal language would in principle suffice to express any thought [27], computational
constraints make it such that compressing frequently used concepts using a higher level
language allows us to reach a higher level of abstraction by freeing memory and process-
ing power, thus making more complex thoughts thinkable [28]. Recently, powerful mod-
els of concept learning have shown that very complex representations can be learned
from only a few positive examples via probabilistic program induction [29, 30, 31, 32],
where programs previously learned are stochastically stored in memory to be used in
new programs, according to their probability of being useful. It was also the main drive
in the recent resurgence of neural networks, where concepts of increasing complexity
are hierarchically compiled in deeper layers, biasing the network towards learning a
final conceptual layer that is a combination of simpler layers [33].
Here, we build on this idea and perform two logical concept learning experiments
to show that humans can change very rapidly –in the course of an experiment– the
repertoire of symbols they use to identify concepts. Each of these experiments explores
a different domain of logic, but both share the same strategy of splitting participants
in two groups, in such a way that each group is presented with different sequence
of concepts. One of the two groups is presented with concepts that are succinctly
described if a certain target logical operator T is used, which we presume does not form
part of the natural repertoire of LoT in this specific domain. However, these concepts
can also be described with a sensibly lengthy combination of primitives excluding T .
We show how the exposure to this set of concepts ‘compile’ the target operator in a
way that, after exposure, subjective complexity is described by an extended language
in which T has been incorporated to the set of primitives. Furthermore, we show that
the relative subjective difficulty of concepts throughout the task is consistent with that
of a Bayesian agent that rationally updates the probability of compiling T according
to how useful it has been to compress concepts so far.
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2. Methods
In this paper, we study four-variable Boolean concepts. Here, a concept is defined
as a subset of the 16 possible items that can be created by combining all states of
this four variables, and we say that a logical formula or statement is compatible with a
given concept if the statement holds true only for the items in the subset. For example,
the formula x3, is not compatible with the concept shown in Fig. 1 (i.e. the subset of
objects that have the first and the second lights on), but the formula x1 ∧ x2 is. A
formula is a syntactic object, and its semantics is a concept. Hence any given concept
is compatible with infinitely many formulas. For example, the concept from Fig. 1 is
compatible with the formula x1 ∧ x2, the formula x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x2, and so on.
To test how human subjective difficulty of concepts depends on the sequence of
concepts previously learned, we designed two experiments. In the first experiment,
we ask whether experience can make more frequent the use of the ‘exclusive or’ (xor,
notated ⊕), a symbol which is very rarely used in spontaneous human reasoning [11].
In the second experiment we ask whether humans can learn a useful operator of
temporal logic, whose expressive power (in the general setting) is beyond that of propo-
sitional Boolean logic.
Figure 1: Example of a concept in Experiment 1. Variables (x1, x2, x3 and x4) correspond to the presence of a
color light in the object (x1 = green, x2 = blue, x3 = red, x4 = orange). Items belonging to the concept x1 ∧ x2 are
highlighted with bold border.
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2.1. Experiment 1
In the first experiment 22 participants between 21 and 32 years old were divided
randomly into a control group and a target group. The two groups were presented
with different sequences of six concepts. For each concept, there was a learning phase,
a testing phase and a feedback phase (see Fig. 2). The average time spent in each
concept was 121±25 s.e.m. seconds, and the average duration of the task was 19±3
s.e.m. minutes.
Testing phase
Which of these
are blickets?
shu✏ing
shu✏ing
These are
your mistakes.
Try again.
Feedback phaseLearning phase
These are blickets
Figure 2: The three phases in learning each concept. During the learning phase, ‘blickets’ (i.e. items belonging
to the current concept) were highlighted with bold border among the 16 objects in the screen. Then, in the testing
phase, the position of items was randomized in the screen (shuffling) and subjects were asked to mark the blickets. In
the feedback face, participants’ mistakes were indicated with red crosses. Participants iterated between the testing
and feedback phases until the classification of all blickets are correct. Participants in the first experiment experienced
a sequence of six concepts in this manner.
During the learning phase, all 16 items were presented in the screen (in random
order), and items belonging to the concept were identified with bold boundaries (see
Fig. 2). Participants were told that only the items with bold boundaries were ‘blickets’
(or ‘tufas’, etc.: we used different words for each concept in the sequence), and asked
them to try to identify what a blicket was. During the testing phase, the 16 items
were shuffled in the screen, and participants were asked to click on items that were
blickets. If they made mistakes after submitting their answer, they were directed to
the feedback phase, in which items that were incorrectly classified were indicated with
a red cross. After having studied the feedback, participants were redirected to the
testing screen, where items were reshuffled. When every item was correctly classified,
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participants were asked to give a verbal description of the concept and then continued
on to the following concept after a resting period. They had up to 5 chances to learn
each concept correctly, otherwise they were directed to the following concept. We
characterize the subjective difficulty of each concept as the time the participant spent
in learning, testing and feedback phases for that concept (excluding the time spent in
the verbal description), and normalized it by dividing it over the total time spent in
all concepts, to account for individual differences in learning speed.
Both groups (target and control), were exposed to 6 concepts. The second, third
and fourth concepts were different between both groups (i.e. training concepts), and the
last two concepts were the same for both groups (i.e. test concepts). The first concept
was the trivial concept xi for both groups, which was aimed to get participants started
in the task.
As mentioned in the introduction, the minimum description length (MDL) of a
concept formalizes its degree of simplicity, and depends on a) the language that we
use to describe such concept, and b) the notion of ‘size’ for terms in such language.
In our case, the language is given in the form of a context-free grammar with rules
to construct logical formulas, and the size is fixed as the number of logical operators
and atoms occurring in the formula –an atom is either a propositional variable or a
negation thereof. The MDL of a concept C is defined as the size of the shortest formula
compatible with C. For example, the MDL of the concept in Fig. 1 in the language of
propositional logic is equal to 3, which is the amount of variables and operators in the
minimal formula x1 ∧ x2.
We consider grammars Bool and Xor (see Fig. 3), each grammar completely defines
a language. The Bool grammar has rules for conjunction (notated ∧), disjunction
(notated ∨), and (possibly negated) propositional symbols x1, x2, x3 and x4. The Xor
grammar has an additional rule for the exclusive disjunction (notated ⊕).
For example, the concept C =“either light x1 is on, or light x2 is on, but not both”
can be described as x1 ⊕ x2 in the language given by Xor. In fact, one can check that
this is the shortest formula compatible with C, and so the MDL of C with respect to
7
Bool
start → bool
bool → (bool ∧ bool)
bool → (bool ∨ bool)
bool → atom
atom → x1 | ¬x1
atom → x2 | ¬x2
atom → x3 | ¬x3
atom → x4 | ¬x4
Xor is as Bool plus rule
bool → (bool⊕ bool)
(b)
Temp is as Bool plus rules
bool → F bool
bool → G bool
atom → r | ¬r
start
bool
∧
bool
∨
bool
atom
x1
bool
atom
¬x2
bool
atom
x3
(a) (c) (d)
Figure 3: The three context-free grammars (CFG) studied in this paper. The Bool CFG (a) is expanded as two
other CFGs: adding a rule for ⊕, obtaining the Xor CFG (b), and adding rues for F, G and r, obtaining the Temp CFG
(c). Bool is compared with Xor in the first experiment, and with Temp in the second experiment. The nonterminals are
start, bool and atom. These CFGs are used to produce logical statements. For example, the formula ((x1∨¬x2)∧x3)
is produced in the Bool CFG as shown in the syntactical tree (d).
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Xor is 3. If we change the language to Bool, we can no longer describe C as x1 ⊕ x2
because ⊕ is not available in Bool. However, in the language given by Bool, this concept
is described by the minimal formula (x1 ∧ ¬x2) ∨ (x2 ∧ ¬x1), of size 7. One can show
that in fact there is no shorter formula in Bool describing C, and so the MDL of C
with respect to Bool is 7.
As shown in Table 1, we presented the target group with training concepts which
were easy to describe using ⊕, but quite complex if other logical operators were use
instead. More technically, concepts for which the MDL relative to Xor are much shorter
than the MDL relative to Bool.
Participants in the control group, on the other hand, experienced a sequence of
concepts that could be easily described using the language given by Bool. After these
training concepts, both groups were presented with the same pair of test concepts: one
which could be already succinctly described in Xor, and one for which there the MDL
did not depend on the underlaying grammar Xor or Bool. We compared learning times
between the two groups for these last two concepts.
As shown in Table 1, training concepts for the target (xor) group were: xi, xi⊕ xj,
xi⊕xj⊕xk, and xk⊕xl. Training concepts for the control group were: xi, xi∨xj, xi∧xj,
and xk ∨ xl (we use the indexes i, j, k, l instead of numbers because variables were
randomized for each subject). After these four concepts, both groups were presented
with the same test concepts: xi ∧ (xj ⊕ xk), and xi ∧ (xj ∨ xk).
Choosing which concepts to show to the target group in order for them to ‘learn’ the
xor operator is a critical component of our analysis and experimental design. Crucially,
the learner must have an option between two alternatives that describe the concept:
one that is succinct but uses the xor operator, or necessarily a much longer one in
the absence of xor. In other words, these concepts must be compatible with short
logical formulas if and only if these are generated by the Xor language. To ensure
that this was the case, we listed, for each concept, all formulas produced by the Bool
and Xor grammars up to length 19. Afterwards, we looked for each training concept
in the target group the shorter compatible logical formula from the Bool grammar
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Target Group (xor) Control Group
Concept
MDL wrt
Xor
MDL wrt
Bool
Concept
MDL wrt
Xor
MDL wrt
Bool
T
ra
in
in
g
xi 1 1 xi 1 1
xi ⊕ xj 3 7 xi ∨ xj 3 3
xi ⊕ xj ⊕ xk 5 19 xi ∧ xj 3 3
xk ⊕ xl 3 7 xk ∨ xl 3 3
Concept
MDL wrt
Xor
MDL wrt
Bool
T
e
st
xi ∧ (xj ⊕ xk) 5 9
xi ∧ (xj ∨ xk) 5 5
Table 1: Sequence of concepts from Experiment 1. Set of concepts presented to both groups in the first experiment.
MDL is measured as the number of operators and variables (excluding the not operator) of the minimal formula with
respect to the specified CFG (the abbreviation ‘wrt’ stands for ‘with respect to’). Variables were randomized in each
experiment: xi could stand for x1, x2, x3 or x4, that is, for any of the four colors.
and compared it with the shorter compatible formula from the Xor grammar. For all
training concepts of the xor group, the shortest compatible formula without the xor
operator is much longer than the shortest compatible formula with the xor operator.
This is shown in Table 1.
2.2. Experiment 2
In the second experiment 17 participants between 23 and 29 years old learned a
sequence of 5 concepts. The average duration of the task was 18±4 s.e.m. minutes.
We told them that a certain fruit was able to grow only in certain types of four-
day sequences (called ‘week’ from now on), and were then requested to identify these
sequences in the same way as in the first experiment, going through the learning phase,
testing phase and feedback phase (see Fig. 2). This is, instead of objects containing
colors as in Experiment 1, each of the 16 objects contained a four-day weather forecast,
such that the 16 objects were each possible sequence of rainy or sunny days, and each
of the four variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 denote, rain at Mon, Tue, Wed, and Thu,
respectively (see Fig. 4).
For this specific set of concepts, the language of description is temporal logic, which
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Target Group (F) Control Group
Concept
MDL wrt
Temp
MDL wrt
Bool
Concept
MDL wrt
Temp
MDL wrt
Bool
T
ra
in
in
g
xi 1 1 xi 1 1
F(r ∧ F(¬r ∧ Fr)) 8 11 xi ∨ ¬xj 3 3
F(r ∧ F(F¬r) 6 9 xi ∨ (¬xj ∧ xk) 5 5
Concept
MDL wrt
Temp
MDL wrt
Bool
T
e
st
F(r ∧ F¬r) 5 11
xi ∧ (xj ∨ ¬xk) 5 5
Table 2: Sequence of concepts from Experiment 2. Set of concepts presented to both groups in the second
experiment. MDL is measured as the number of operators and variables (excluding the not operator) of the minimal
formula with respect to the specified CFG. Variables were randomized in the experiment: xi could stand for x1, x2, x3
or x4, that is, for rain at any of the four days.
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu Mon Tue Wed Thu Mon Tue Wed Thu Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Mon Tue Wed Thu
Figure 4: Example of a concept in Experiment 2. Variables x1, x2, x3 and x4 correspond to rain in each of the
four days. Items belonging to the concept x2 (i.e. rain on Tue) are marked with bold border.
is able to predicate about future events using a very simple syntax. Unlike in propo-
sitional logic, in temporal logic we can succinctly express concepts involving temporal
patterns. For example, using a very short statement (namely, F(r ∧ F¬r), see below),
we can say that a four-day object is a blicket only if in this object there is a rainy day
followed by a sunny day. To formulate this apparently simple statement in proposi-
tional logic, the minimal formula is (x1∧¬x2)∨ (x2∧¬x3)∨ (x3 ∧¬x4), which is much
more complex than the statement thought as a temporal pattern.
Formally, in temporal logic formulas are evaluated at a certain day of the week. For
simplicity, days in the week are represented with numbers: 1 = Mon, 2 = Tue, 3 =
11
Wed, 4 = Thu. The variable r is true at a certain day d if d is rainy, and false otherwise.
Notice that, unlike propositional logic, the truth value of the atom r depends on the
day of the week where we evaluate it. So r is true at 1 (i.e. Mon) in the top left week
of Fig. 4 but false at 2 (i.e. Tue) of the same week. The operator F for “there exists in
the future” allows us to move the point of evaluation to a future day of the week. The
formula Fϕ is true at day d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} if there exist d′ ∈ {d + 1, . . . , 4} such that ϕ
is true at d′. For example, Fr is true at 2 if 3 or 4 are rainy, and F(r ∧ F¬r) is true at
1 if there are d, d′ ∈ {2, . . . , 4} such that d < d′, d is rainy and d′ is not. As another
example, F(r∧ F¬r) evaluated in 1 is true in those weeks in which there is a rainy day
followed by a sunny day.
The dual operator G stands for “always in the future”. The formula Gϕ is true at
day d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} if for all d′ ∈ {d + 1, . . . , 4} we have that ϕ is true at d′. We work
with a logic that also allows us to state that a certain day of the week is rainy. The
nominals x1, x2, x3 and x4 are intended to do that. The statement xi is true if and only
if day i is rainy irrespective of the day of evaluation (i = 1, . . . , 4). Unless otherwise
stated, all formulas are evaluated at 1 (i.e. Mon).
Following the same strategy as in Experiment 1, here we also consider two grammars
(see Fig. 3): Bool and Temp. The semantics for Bool are just as the one for experiment
1 –only the context was changed: on/off color lights before, are rainy/sunny days now.
The Temp grammar have additional rules for the temporal part of the logic: rules
for F, G and the (possibly negated) r, whose the semantics are as explained above.
Notice that although the semantics of the temporal logic is quite different from the
one for propositional logic (in particular, the former needs a point of evaluation to give
meaning to formulas), the rules for the Boolean part coincide, and are given by the
grammar Bool. Observe also that the point of evaluation in a temporal logic is not
part of the syntax of the language, in the same way a valuation is not part of a formula
in propositional logic.
As in the previous experiment, we considered the size of a formula as the number
of atoms plus the number of operators, and the MDL of a concept with respect to a
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given language of description as the length of the shortest formula in such language
describing the concept.
For example, the concept C = “there is a rainy day and, then, a non-rainy day”
can be simply described by F(r ∧ F¬r) in the language given by Temp. One can check
that this is the shortest formula compatible with C, and so the MDL of C with respect
to Temp is 5. If we change the language to Bool, we can no longer describe C as the
above formula because F is not allowed in Bool. However, it can be described by the
formula (x1 ∧ ¬x2) ∨ (x2 ∧ ¬x3) ∨ (x3 ∧ ¬x4), of size 11, which can be constructed in
Bool. One can show that there is no shorter formula in Bool describing C, and so the
MDL of C with respect to Bool is 11.
As shown in Table 2, subjects belonging to the target (F) group were trained on
three concepts: xi, F(r∧F(¬r∧Fr)) (at some point it occurs r, then ¬r and then r), and
F(r ∧ FF¬r) (at some point it occurs r, and then, at least two days later, ¬r occurs).
Subjects in the control group were presented with concepts: xi, xi ∨ xj, xi ∨ (xj ∧ xk),
where we use the different indexes i, j, k, l instead of numbers because variables were
randomized for each subject.
After these four concepts, both groups were presented with the same test concepts:
F(r∧ F¬r) and xi ∧ (xj ∨ xk). As in the first experiment, we ensured that the minimal
formula for the training concepts of the target group was significantly longer when F,
G and r were excluded from the language than when they were available, by generating
all compatible formulas from the Bool grammar up to length 17 (see Table 2). In fact,
only F and r are needed for achieving succinctness for the concepts in the target group
and in the first test concept. The operator G was included for the sake of semantic
completeness: since we only allow for atomic negation, G is needed as the dual of F
(namely, ¬F¬ϕ is semantically equivalent to Gϕ.)
3. Model-Free Results
We measure the subjective difficulty of a given concept as the total time needed
by the participant to successfully encode the concept, which indicates that they can
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express reliable which exemplars belong to the concept and which do not. This is, the
time spent in the learning, testing and feedback phases from Fig. 2.
Participants from the Xor (resp. F) group were able to encode the test concept that
uses the ⊕ (resp. F) operator much more efficiently than participants in the control
group, see Fig. 5 (top row). In other words, having encoded concepts that require
one specific target operator T in order to be succinctly expressed caused participants
to encode more efficiently the test concept that required T in order to be succinctly
expressed. Under the assumption that the subjective difficulty of concepts is propor-
tional to the length of the programs that represent them, this result is only explained
if participants in the target group incorporated this operator into their language after
being exposed to the training concepts.
Importantly, the concepts of the target group did not require participants to use T in
order to be encoded, but they were more succinctly encoded if they did. Contrastingly,
participants in the control group were not previously presented with concepts that
needed T to be succinctly encoded. When presented with the test concept that use T ,
the control group needed much more time to successfully encode the concept, suggesting
that they were dealing with more complex explanations than participants’ in the target
group, or, equivalently, that T was not readily available in their language.
To quantify this result we measure, for each participant, the relative time spent
in the first test concept (that use ⊕ in the first experiment and F in the second one)
compared to the total time spent in the two test concepts. Participants from the target
groups were able to go through the test concept that uses T faster than participants
in the control groups (see Fig. 5, top). When comparing the time spent in the test
concept that use T with the total time spent in the two test concepts, a paired t-test
reveals t = 8 (p = 10−7) for the first experiment and t = 4.33 (p < 0.001) for the
second one, indicating that the relative time spent in the test concept that used T was
much longer for the control group than for the target group.
This result shows that the subjective difficulty of a concept strongly depends on
prior exposure to other concepts that share the same primitives in a LoT.
14
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Figure 5: (Top) Concept learning time of the test concept that uses the target operator relative to total test time
(i.e. time in both test concepts). (Middle) Difficulty predicted by the model for the test concept that uses the target
operator relative to the sum of difficulties predicted for both test concepts. We compare it with the difficulties inferred
by the inflexible model, which should be equal for both groups (Bottom).
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4. Model
We examine the hypothesis that experience shapes the repertoire of the LoT, by
compiling expressions which are used frequently into new symbols of the language. We
examine this hypothesis relying on models which combine symbolic representations
with statistical approaches [34, 35, 36], by implementing a space of compositional
hypothesis generated by a rule producing probabilistic grammar [37].
In simpler words, we deal with a symbolic language in which the different symbols
and operations of the language are used with different probabilities. This allows us
to inquire whether experience affects these probabilities, providing a quantitative and
graded manner to address changes in the repertoire of symbols of a language of thought.
Under this model, the probability of retrieving a certain sequence of symbols de-
crease exponentially with the length of the sequence. To test if humans have the ability
to compile primitives into new useful symbol in the language, we anticipated the new
compiled symbol and include it a priori in the language, but with vanishing probability
of being used. We include the compiled rule a priori in the language to simplify the
model, but the probability of using the compiled symbol can be analogously interpreted
as the probability that a rational agent that does not have the compiled symbol a priori
decides to add the compiled expression to her language (as a new primitive). After
incorporating the new symbol, the probability of retrieving it is much higher than the
probability of separately retrieving each element that comprises it.
We first describe how concept learning occurs assuming a fixed LoT (subsection
Fixed Model). Then, we describe how concept learning occurs if we allow the LoT
to change based on the sequence of concepts experienced so far (subsection Dynamic
Model)
4.1. Fixed Model
Under the Language of Thought assumption, given a concept C (e.g. Fig. 1), the
probability that an agent uses formula ϕ to explain this concept is defined by Bayes
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theorem:
P (ϕ | C) ∝ P (C | ϕ)P (ϕ). (1)
The likelihood P (C | ϕ) of a logical statement ϕ can be simply defined as 1 if the
statement is true for the given concept C and 0 otherwise. In other words, for any
given concept, only explanations that describe this concept are considered as possible
explanations. The likelihood term has been defined more flexibly in the literature [37,
11], allowing for mislabeled elements. We keep this simpler definition in order to
reduce the number of free parameters of the model, as we do not intend to account for
mislabeling errors in our experiment.
The prior P (ϕ) is defined by augmenting the context-free grammars shown in Fig. 3
into probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFG). In the PCFG, each rule has associ-
ated a parameter indicating the probability of using that rule. A PCFG can be used
to produce logical statements in the same manner as in a CFG (see legend in Fig. 3
for an example): each non terminal remaining in the statement is expanded using a
rule of the PCFG with probability proportional to that rule’s associated parameter,
until no nonterminals remain in the statement. Intuitively, the probability of produc-
ing a certain statement ϕ is proportional to the product of the rules that were used in
producing that statement, and therefore inversely proportional to the formula’s length
|ϕ|. We formally explain how this term is calculated in the next subsection.
We assume that the probability that a subject uses formula ϕ to explain concept C
is proportional to the posterior P (ϕ | C), and the subjective difficulty dC of a concept
C to a participant is proportional to the length of the formula (|ϕ|) that the participant
is using to explain that concept. However, one there is no way to know directly from
the data which formula ϕ the participant is using (and therefore we do not know |ϕ|).
Hence, the most parsimonious approach is to consider the entire posterior distribution
P(ϕ | C) over possible formulas1.
1This is equivalent to the Sampling Hypothesis described in [38], by which subjects represent distributions through
samples, but the same result is obtained if one thinks that each subjects carries entire probability distributions.
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Given a concept C, the expected length EC(|ϕ|) of the formulas used by the par-
ticipant under her posterior distribution P(ϕ | C) is simply:
EC(|ϕ|) =
∑
{ϕ|P (C|ϕ)=1}
|ϕ| P (ϕ | C), (2)
where the sum is over all compatible formulas produced by the PCFG (with probability
P (ϕ)). Since we do not know |ϕ|, we can only estimate the difficulty of concept C
experienced by the participant using the estimated value of |ϕ| under her posterior
distribution (i.e. EC(|ϕ|)):
dC ∝ EC(|ϕ|) + αNC , (3)
where we added a term that accounts for the cardinality of the concept extension: NC
is the number of marked items in the screen (e.g. 8 in Fig. 1, left) or 16 minus the
number of marked items if the cardinality is greater than 8, and α is a free parameter
fitted globally for all concepts and subjects to its maximum likelihood value of 0.45.
In this way, we remove the asymmetry between positive and negative examples, while
accounting for the toil taken by considering a larger number of items simultaneously.
In practice, to approximate EC(|ϕ|) for each concept C, we calculated the posterior
probability P (ϕ | C) of all compatible formulas ϕs generated by the Bool, Xor, Bool
and Temp grammars up to size 19 and then use (2). Since the space of all possible
ϕs grows exponentially with |ϕ|, normative procedures for estimating P (ϕ | C) in
this space involve stochastic search algorithms. However, in our experiment we were
able to exhaustively enumerate and calculate the posterior probability of all formulas
generated by the PCFG up to a sufficiently high size M such that all formulas with
|ϕ| > M have vanishing probabilities when compared to shorter compatible formulas
for the current concept (because the prior P (ϕ) decrease exponentially with the size
of the formula and the likelihood of all compatible formulas is equal to 1).
4.2. Dynamic Model
Up to this point, we assumed that, given a concept C, the posterior distribution
over formulas P (ϕ | C) was independent of the other concepts presented to the partici-
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pant. However, if the rule’s probabilities in the PCFG of each participant are updated
accordingly to the concepts that she experiences, the prior P (ϕ) in (1) will change
with experience, and so will EC(|ϕ|) in (2) and finally her subjective difficulty dC in
(3). Therefore, the subjective difficulty of a concept experienced by a participant will
depend on the sequence of concepts that were previously presented to this participant.
In other words, since now P (ϕ) depends on the sequence of concepts experienced
by the participant, instead of (1), we have:
P (ϕ | Ct) ∝ P (Ct | ϕ)P (ϕ | C1, . . . , Ct−1), (4)
where Ct is the concept presented at trial t, and P (ϕ | C1, . . . , Ct−1) depends on the
state of the PCFG at trial t, which in turn depends on how the PCFG gets updated
from trial to trial.
Intuitively, the update process increases the probability of using a certain rule in
the PCFG accordingly to how useful this rule was to compress compatible formulas for
the concepts previously learned in the same domain. Specifically, we model the update
process in a normative manner: the probability of using a rule of the PCFG at trial
t is equal to the Bayesian posterior probability that this rule will enable the learner
to find compressed explanations at trial t, according to how useful it was to compress
explanations in trials 1, . . . , t− 1.
To formalize the update of the PCFG, we define P (ϕ) similarly to [37]. Specifically,
the prior probability of a logical statement at trial t in the concept sequence uses a single
Dirichlet-multinomial for the set of rule expansions. The Dirichlet is parameterized by
a set of positive real numbers Dti , one for each rule i in the PCFG, which in turn
determine the probability of using rule i at trial t: a higher Di indicates a higher
probability of using rule i.
The prior is specified by the set Dirichlet parameters D0 with which we start the
experiment (D0 represents a vector containing the prior parameters of all rules in the
grammar at trial 0). In our experiment, we set the prior Dirichlet parameters of all rules
equal to 1, and the parameter of the rule that expands the target operator to a value
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several orders of magnitude smaller (≈ 10−4). This means that the target operator was
practically absent at the beginning of the experiment, but it was technically possible
to ‘learn it’ by increasing its probability as the experiment developed.
Under the Dirichlet model, the prior P (ϕ | C1, . . . , Ct−1) can be rewritten using
the Dirichlet parameters as P (ϕ | Dt). Therefore, to know how P (ϕ | C) updates from
trial to trial, we only need to know how D updates from trial to trial.
The Dirichlet parameter of rule i at trial t+1 is equal to its parameter at trial t plus
the amount of times the production i was used in generating all formulas compatible
with the concept at trial t (we note Mi(ϕ) as the number of times that rule i is used
in generating formula ϕ), weighted by each formula’s posterior probability at trial t:
Dt+1i = D
t
i +
∑
{ϕ|P (Ct|ϕ)=1}
P (ϕ | Dt) Mi(ϕ). (5)
This Bayesian learning mechanism increases the probability of using rules that
allow concepts to be succinctly described. This happens because these formulas have
higher probability than longer formulas, so the Dirichlet parameters of the rules that
comprises these formulas increase more strongly than those of the rules that comprises
longer formulas. Crucially, this sole Bayesian mechanism can account for all observed
patterns in the experiments. We do not need to posit an external, computationally
demanding, heuristic compositional process to model the data; it suffices to exploit the
learning dynamics already built in the model.
For comparison, we include results from an ‘Inflexible Model’, in which the proba-
bility of using different rules of the PCFG model do not update from trial to trial, such
that the rule that use target operator remains with a low prior probability throughout
the trials of the experiment, indicating that the agent is incapable of compiling. This is,
the Inflexible model has fixed Dirichlet parameters throughout the concept sequence,
equal to D0.
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5. Results
The model accurately captures the dynamics of learning across concepts. If we
did not allow the model to increase the probability of using the compiled operator
T between concepts (⊕ in the first experiment and F in the second one), the control
group and the target group would be indistinguishable in the test phase, so the model
would predict equal average formula length for both groups (see Fig. 5, bottom row).
Instead, by adjusting the prior probability of T based on concept exposure, the flexible
model is able to capture learning time patterns in the target groups (R2 = 0.98 for the
xor group and R2 = 0.92 for the F group compared to R2 = 0.66 and R2 = 0.49 for
the inflexible model), as shown in Fig. 6. Both models perform similarly in the control
groups (R2 = 0.85 for Experiment 1 and R2 = 0.86 for Experiment 2; R2 = 0.80 and
R2 = 0.86 for the inflexible model, see Fig. S1 in Supplementary Information). The
impact of the learning capability of the model is most evident in the target groups
concept sequences, which were designed to this effect. If the concepts do not bias the
PCFG’s production rules one way or the other, it is expected that an inflexible model
will provide a reasonable fit. However, it is difficult to tell a priori how unbiased a
set of concepts really is, so experiments relying on repeated concept exposure should
always take learning into account.
As suggested in previous studies [39], allowing the model to update its beliefs from
concept to concept is a requisite to capture human learning times. We now explain
why the pattern of subjective difficulties from Fig. 6 (top row) is accurately captured
by a rational model that updates the probability of using the compiled function (i.e.
⊕ and F) in a Bayesian manner, according to how useful it was to compress concepts
so far (Fig. 6 (middle row)).
In this scenario, learning for the model is formalized by the update of rule param-
eters from concept t to concept t + 1 according to (5). In Fig. 7 we show how this
learning takes place in the sequence of concepts of these experiments. For the xor
group, there are mainly two competing formulas the first time the second concept is
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presented: xi ⊕ xj and (xi ∧ ¬xj) ∨ (¬xi ∧ xj). Note that after the first time the sec-
ond concept is presented the parameters of the ∧ and ∨ rules increase more than the
parameter of the ⊕ rule (the plot is in logarithmic scale). This happens because, given
the low a priori value of the parameter of the ⊕ rule, the posterior of the formulas of
type (xi ∧¬xj)∨ (¬xi ∧ xj), which do not use the ⊕ operator, is much higher than the
posterior of xi⊕xj. For the same reason, in Fig. 6 we see a large predicted difficulty by
the flexible model for this concept (since the posterior lies mainly over these longer for-
mulas without ⊕, see (2)). However, the little increment in the ⊕ rule after the second
concept is sufficient for making the formula xk ⊕ xl to have higher relative posterior
the second time this concept is presented, making the increment in the parameter of
the ⊕ rule much greater than before. Additionally, the difficulty inferred by the model
is much smaller the second time the concept is presented (compare fourth and second
concepts in Fig. 6), since now the posterior is more evenly distributed between long
(without ⊕) and short (with ⊕) formulas (see (2)). Finally, when the concept compat-
ible with the formula xi ∧ (xj ⊕ xk) is presented in the test, the learner has completely
compiled the xor rule into her language, ascribing the formulas that use the ⊕ operator
a much higher posterior probability relative to the long formulas that do not use the
⊕ operator. Therefore, the inferred difficulty is much smaller than those describing
previous concepts (see fifth concept in Fig. 6).
A similar pattern is observed for the F group. When the second and third concepts
are presented, the low value of the F rule parameter causes most of the posterior to lie
on the (longer) alternatives that do not use F. However, the formulas that do use F have
a non zero posterior probability, significant enough to cause the parameter of the F rule
to increase according to (5). Finally, when the test concept compatible with the formula
F(r∧F¬r) is presented, the shorter formulas that use F have higher posterior probability
than the longer alternatives without F, so we see a low the predicted difficulty for
concept four in Fig. 6.
Updating the probability of using the compiled rule is therefore crucial to capture
human learning patterns. A natural question is if it is possible to capture human
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learning patterns without compiling the target operator, and instead independently
updating the probability of the rules that comprises it. In other words, we have shown
that the Dynamic Model over the Xor and Temp grammars capture human patterns
much more accurately than the Inflexible Model over these grammars, and now we
ask if the Dynamic Model over the Bool grammar (that does not have the compiled
operators ⊕ and F) would also capture human learning patterns. This model, however,
makes practically the same predictions than the Inflexible Model (shown in Fig. 6
(bottom)). This happens because to express the concepts that use the target operators
⊕ and F in the Bool grammar we use a lengthy, unbiased combination of the rules from
Bool, so learning does not bias the parameters of the Bool grammar one way or the
other: the sequence of concepts learned during training does not create any useful bias
in the production probabilities of the grammar in order to learn more efficiently the
test concept. Including the possibility of compiling the target operator is therefore key
to predict human subjective difficulties.
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6. Discussion
Showing that learning leads to a process of compiling primitives into new functions
in a LoT is the main contribution of this work. We also made two methodological
contributions. First, we use the model in a novel way to predict concept learning times
by tying them to the length of their compatible formulas weighted by their posterior
probability. Second, the temporal logic we use in our second experiment is a modal
logic whose expressive power is, in the general setting, halfway between propositional
and first order logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of a modal logic
in the study of human concept learning.
We showed that the human subjective difficulty in learning concepts strongly de-
pends on the exposure to prior concepts in the experiment. Participants that expe-
rienced a set of concepts that could be succinctly described only if a target operator
T was used were able to encode more efficiently the test concept that also needed
T to be described in simpler terms when compared with participants in the control
group. Furthermore, the relative subjective difficulty of the sequence of concepts is ac-
curately described by a Bayesian PCFG, which includes the compiled target operator
with vanishing probability and rationally updates as it becomes more useful.
Participants’ behavior is consistent with a language that compiles a new target
operator T as it becomes more useful, therefore reducing future learning times, or, in
other words, maximizing the expected value of future computations within resource-
bounded constraints [40] by minimizing the expected description length of future con-
cepts. This behavior emerged naturally from the Bayesian learning dynamics already
build in our model, without the need to add an external heuristic compositional pro-
cess (e.g. [30, 31]). Previous works have similarly shown that participants behavior
maximizes the expected value of computation in various domains, by rationally using
cognitive resources (e.g. [41], see [42, 43] for reviews). Indeed, these notions of compu-
tational rationality seem to be paving the way to human-like machine intelligence in
various real word applications [44].
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Although it is clear that the learning of new operations is more efficient in a com-
municative or pedagogical context [46, 47, 48], we have shown that it takes place in an
undirected setting, where participants’ only reward for doing it is a bet on reducing
future learning times. Importantly, we do not claim that participants have explicitly
learned the ⊕ or F operators as per their formal definitions in natural language. How-
ever, their language of thought seem to have generated an operation that is sufficient
to compress such patterns of data in order to identify them more quickly. Similarly,
studies in implicit finite-state grammar learning experiments have shown that partic-
ipants do not need to explicitly know the rules they have learned in order to perform
well [49, 50].
In our experiment, to study the degree to which learning was implicit or explicit
(this is, if the participant was or not aware of it), we included a verbal report after each
concept, and found, in general, similar verbal reports for participants in the control
and target groups, indicating that the knowledge acquired by the target group could
be implicit. However, a more formal approach is necessary to distinguish implicit and
explicit knowledge in concept learning [51]. For example, one could ask for a confidence
report and see if confidence increases with the accuracy in encoding the concept, sug-
gesting explicit knowledge. Recently, [52] studied the determinants of confidence in a
concept learning task, and found that, although subjective difficulties did follow the ra-
tional model, subjective confidence was primarily determined by external factors, and
only secondarly by the probability of having correctly encoded the concept, indicating
that implicit knowledge may play a principal role in general concept learning.
By probing and modeling the dependence of the LoT with prior concept expo-
sure, we also highlight a fundamental difficulty in trying to experimentally uncover
what the actual human symbolic substrate of thought is. These permanent change in
rule probabilities has been mostly disregarded in the LoT literature [45]. Most works
simply do away with them by integrating them out and focusing only on formula prob-
abilities [37]. Some, while still marginalizing the probabilities, do look at changes in
Dirichlet parameters, but with an emphasis on rule utility, ignoring the influence ex-
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perience exerts on them [11]. We claim that when a specific language beats a second
one at fitting some experimental data, what we may be seeing is an effect of prior
experience (including from the experiment itself), more than an intrinsic feature of the
LoT. Experimental results have, for instance, shown that a grammar with and, or, and
not better explains Boolean concept learning than one with nand, despite both being
representationally equivalent [11]. In our view, this cannot be taken to mean anything
more than that in the current state of affairs of the world, the nand operator is not
very useful for compressing information. We have shown, however, that participants
can rapidly compile new expressions in their LoT if they begin to be useful, which
emphasizes that one cannot simply ignore the order in which concepts are presented
to the participant when studying aspects of the LoT.
When Fodor proposed the Language of Thought hypothesis [4], what he had in mind
was a symbolic system we all came equipped with from birth. Stating that this language
is in fact flexible might seem in outright contradiction with Fodor’s original idea. In
fact, what studies in the LoT literature (including this one) are probably probing is one
among many languages in a hierarchy of increasing abstraction, and beginning with
Fodor’s proposed language. As we progress in life, we find some conceptual summaries
useful, and compiled them in a more abstract token. It is even likely that there is
no proper hierarchy with sharply defined boundaries between levels, but instead a less
organized progression of concepts of increasing abstraction, with thought progressing
seamlessly using constructs at different levels. The software analogy of programming
languages compiling to lower level machine code might be utterly misguided, with
current approaches to compositionality inherently limited by the hierarchical view.
Further empirical studies of the way we effectively reuse concepts will hopefully pave
the way for a broader understanding of human cognition.
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